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Abstract  
 
Mergers and acquisitions have proved to be the most effective strategies towards the 
completion and achievement of the organizational objectives of shipping firms. The 
importance of this corporate event is evidenced by the increasing number of 
transactions that took place in recent years.  
The purpose of this dissertation is to investigate the stock market reaction of listed 
bidding shipping firms to the announcement of a merger or an acquisition. The 
transactions of mergers do not only create value on the merging enterprises, but also 
generate a positive or negative wealth effect for the shareholders of bidding firms. 
Employing the classical event study methodology of the dataset consists of 172 
mergers and acquisitions that occurred between 2000 and 2014. Empirical results 
revealed positive abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns for the acquiring firms 
on the announcement day and period, respectively.  
 
Keywords: Shipping; Event Study Analysis; Stock Market Returns; Mergers and 
Acquisitions; Bidding firms. 
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1.  Background Information  
Mergers and acquisitions are some of the most popular and significant forms of 
corporate development. To begin with, Brooks and Ritchie (2006) stated that mergers 
are deemed as an alternative to generate internal corporate growth. According to Lev 
(1993) mergers became a “trend” during the decades of 1960 and 1980 (merger 
“waves”). In the beginning, these “waves” appeared as a part of financial activity, but 
after some years they were regarded as indispensable parts of the investment 
strategy. It is widely admitted that, mergers and acquisitions (M&As henceforth) 
generally occur in cyclical patterns, usually driven by the necessity of technological 
and financial restructuring.  
Numerous enterprises globally engaged in such activities in order to gain benefits. 
According to Kummer and Steger (2008), the search and desire for growth is the 
main motive behind M&As. As internal growth alternatives most of the times fail, 
M&As seem to provide the greatest and the quickest form of growth. M&As are 
means of acquiring knowledge, stimulating continuous development, reaching 
economies of scales and scope and reducing risk exposure. Even though there is 
mixed evidence regarding the acceptance of the corporate transaction, the main 
rationale behind it is the attainment of more benefits than the firms had when they 
were independent. The value that is created can be classified in three sources: 
Operational synergy, financial synergy and managerial synergy.  
Announcements of M&As have a direct impact on the stock prices of both the bidding 
and the target firm. This happens due to the fact that investors revise their 
expectations according to the arrival of the new information. Fama (1970) claimed 
that “stock prices reflect all publicly available information on an underlying asset”. 
The stock market reaction of target and bidding companies to M&As has been 
extensively analyzed in the literature. However, there is a literature gap about the 
wealth effect of M&As in the shipping industry.  
Noteworthy consolidation has been observed to shipping industry, a fact that drove 
an increasing rate of mergers and acquisitions (Van de Voorde et al., 
2009).According to Heaver et al. (2000), an amount of more than US$200 billion 
were spent over the last three decades on more than 4,100 M&A deals globally. The 
highly competitive environment of the shipping industry results in demand of high 
quality services in combination with low cost. It is imperative that both of them should 
be fulfilled in order to meet customer needs. Furthermore, in order to remain 
competitive, companies look for international expansion so that they can cover 
market needs. Therefore, maritime  transportation sector is characterized by 
numerous cross-border mergers. Another reason that  partially explains why shipping 
companies engage into M&As is the increasing economies of scale both in large 
vessels and big fleets (capacity) and because of the extended trade routes needs. 
Freight transport companies are merged horizontally (same mode, parallel supply 
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chain) and vertically (between different modes, adjacent supply chain). Although 
there has been prior literature on M&As of transportation sector, literature on 
maritime sector is limited.   
This study aims to examine the financial effects of M&A announcements of acquiring 
firms in the liner shipping industry. On this basis, the current study: 
 Investigates the acquiring firms market’s reaction to the announcement of a 
merger or acquisition in the shipping industry; 
 Explores the factors that explain the stock price reaction during the 
announcement period (-1, +1 days);  
 Compares the market’s reaction to M&As during the pre-crisis(2000-2007) and 
post-crisis (2008-2014) period; and 
 Examines whether the market’s reaction depends on the way of financing of 
the transaction (cash or stock financed merger). 
In order to fulfill the research objectives, the current study employs the event study 
methodology. More specifically, both the market model and the market adjusted 
model are utilized. What is more, by using those models, I have managed to 
calculate both the abnormal and the cumulative abnormal returns around the M&A for 
the bidding firms. Finally, i use pooled cross-sectional regression analysis in order to 
identify the factors that explain abnormal behavior surrounding M&As.  
In order to accomplish all the previously mentioned objectives, the current research 
project is structured as follows. To begin with, the first section includes an 
introduction in which background information is presented. Consecutively, in the 
second and third section, an in-depth literature review on international mergers and 
acquisitions on shipping industry is provided. In section four, data selection and 
research methodology are described. The fifth section includes the empirical results 
of the study. Last but not least, the conclusions of the study are presented in section 
six.  
2. International Literature on Mergers and Acquisitions 
M&As combine both aspects of corporate finance and strategic management1 and 
deal with the purchasing and infusing  with other companies. In a merger, two 
organizations are joining forces to become a new one, usually with a new name. Due 
to the fact that firms involved are mainly of similar size, the term “merger of equals” is 
used. In an acquisition, a bigger business buys a smaller one; the latter might be 
absorbed into the parent organization or run as a subsidiary. A company under 
consideration by another organization for a merger or acquisition is sometimes 
referred to as a “target”.1  
                                                          
1Definitions are executed from Investopedia Website 
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2.1 M&A Motives 
 
Firms among all industries are merged or acquired in order to gain specific benefits. 
Companies looking to expand are presented with two alternatives, internal growth or 
growth through mergers and acquisitions. Gaughan (2002) supported that internal 
growth may be a slow and uncertain process, whereas growth through M&As can be 
a much more rapid and beneficial process. And this is exactly the rationale behind 
such transactions; to obtain more benefits than they would if they were independent. 
M&As refer to offer that the buyer makes to the seller. According to Ravenscraft and 
Scherer (1987), the buyer makes an attractive and mutually beneficial offer to the 
target firm in order to achieve a number of reasons such as the creation of potential 
synergy, the increase of the market share or the decrease of fixed costs. On the 
other hand, the seller would accept an offer either to diversify their investment 
portfolio or to increase their liquidity levels.  
For shareholders of both target and bidding firms, mergers are profitable. However, 
there are some contradictory studies regarding the social acceptance of the 
corporate event. Dutz (1989) claimed that mergers and acquisitions are not desirable 
by the society due to rationalization of capacity and for this reason they should be 
formally prohibited. On the other hand, Caves (1989) emphasized on the economic 
and the social efficiency due to the value creation.   
Value creation in mergers can be classified in three sources: operational synergy, 
financial synergy and managerial one; a belief firstly expressed by Sudarsanam et al. 
(1996). 
2.1.1 Operational Synergy 
 
According to Bradley et al. (1983), an operating synergy may be derived from 
economies of scale, increased market power and share, efficient management and 
effective combination of complementary resources. 
2.1.2 Financial Synergy 
 
Lev (1993) pointed out that the motivation behind such synergies could be both 
short-term and long-term. On the one hand, tax effects, liquidity improvement and 
price-earnings can be regarded as short-term goals, whereas on the other hand 
capital redeployment and improvement of debt capacity as long term goals.  
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2.1.3 Managerial Synergy 
 
What is more, Lev (1993) mentioned the motives behind managerial synergies,  with 
the most important of them being risk diversification, executive compensation and 
human resources.  
2.2 Theoretical Frameworks regarding the rationale for mergers and 
acquisitions 
2.2.1 Managerial Hypothesis 
 
According to the managerial hypothesis, shareholders conduct mergers or 
acquisitions in order to fulfill their own interests and targets. It is believed that these 
objectives do not lead to mutually positive abnormal returns and do not offer value 
maximization for neither the bidding company nor the target firm. This hypothesis 
was also called by Bishop et al. (1987) “anti-takeover theory”, due to the fact that 
managers act so as to promote their personal agenda. Another possible reason that 
encourages mergers is based on managerial hypothesis and consists of the 
diversification and the reduction of human capital.  Amihud and Lev (1981) and 
Morck et al. (1990) backed this claim by supporting that the new merging firm is 
divided and shared amongst many people of both target and bidding firms.  
2.2.2 Value Maximizing Hypothesis 
 
Gonzalez et al. (1997) and Sudursanam et al. (1996) stated that the most important 
reason of a merger or acquisition is the rapid growth of shareholders’ wealth. In order 
to materialize, a M&A’s net present value should be positive or at least non-negative. 
Consequently, should the above object cannot be met, managers of the bidding firms 
may not proceed with the merging proposal and those of target firms may not accept 
the offer (Powell, 1997). Furthermore, according to Berger et al. (1988),the 
combination of assets of merging firms becomes bigger than it was when they were 
independent. This is called static effect. Therefore, the bigger the assets, the greater 
the probability of merging firms to present a greater value maximization or wealth 
effect for their shareholders. It is agreed that consistent with this hypothesis are the 
financial motives and synergy effects.  
2.2.3 Non-Value Maximizing Hypothesis 
 
Non-Value maximizing hypothesis has been proposed by Halpern (1973 and 1983) 
and claims that any merger or acquisition has no economic gains or value for the 
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merging firm. According to him, the reasons that firms proceed to mergers are not 
financial, but there are other hidden motives behind them. Purchasing companies 
may desire to maximize their market share, enter a new market or expand to a new 
geographical region; actions that would not have been possible without a merger. 
The majority of the non-value maximizing mergers are horizontal. Due to the fact that 
most of the times they are subject to government regulations, they tend to create 
monopolies. 
2.2.4 Inefficient Management Hypothesis 
 
Inefficient management of target firms became one significant motive for merger or 
acquisition. This inefficiency can be pointed out in various indicators and ratios such 
as low P/E ratio or undervalued stocks. Acquiring companies focus on the non-
efficiently utilization of targets’ resources and; therefore are motivated to takeover the 
target firms (Malatesta, 1983). 
Concluding, there appears to exist a variety of motives that leads shareholders and 
managers to conduct mergers and acquisitions. The four basic hypotheses behind 
the rationale of mergers and acquisitions have been analyzed above.  
 
2.3 Historical Background of M&As 
 
The history of mergers is mainly dominated by five distinctive time periods. According 
to Gaughan (2002), time periods of high merging activity were usually followed time 
periods of lower activity, forming a never-ending time-loop. These waves occurred 
between 1897 and 1904, 1916 and 1929, 1965 and 1969, 1984 and 1989 and in the 
early 1990’s.  
The first merger era (1987-1904) was one of the highest intensity because it 
happened right after the great depression of 1883. Wenston et al. (2001) identified 
that during this first wave many horizontal mergers took place in the field of steel, oil, 
telephone and basic manufacturing industries.  
According to Gaughan (2002), the second merger wave (1916- 1929) was mostly 
characterized by Oligopolies, industry consolidation and large-scale formation of 
conglomerates. The invention of radio and automobile are fine examples of this 
period. Moreover, Gaughan (2002) claimed that many of the corporations that were 
formed during this period are still successful by today.  
The third merger wave (1965-1969) included various activities in multiple industries. 
The majority of them, approximately 80%, were conglomerate mergers because it 
was difficult to develop horizontal and vertical mergers in the United States due to 
antitrust laws. 
  
 
  
 
2 
Gaughan (2002) claimed that the fourth merger wave (1984-1989) was characterized 
by mega mergers and hostile takeovers with innovative acquisition techniques and 
investment tools being employed. Junk bonds and financial improvements led the 
majority of the companies to seek buyers in order to taken over. The deregulation of 
major industries, for example aviation and maritime industry, caused a 
disproportional number of transactions in favor of specific industries in contrast to 
some others.  
The consolidation of some industries through larger scale acquisitions of companies 
took place in the fifth merger wave. In this period mergers became a worldwide 
phenomenon, as Gaughan (2002) supports. Firms realized that economic expansion 
through mergers and acquisitions is viable and quicker than trying to grow internally. 
It is an undisputed fact that within this fifth wave the shipping industry has conducted 
the biggest, in both size and value, and the most significant deals in its history. 
 
Figure 1: M&As waves during the last decades 
 
Source: Homberg, F., Rost, K., &Osterloh, M. (2009).  
 
Having analyzed the M&As till the early of 90s, Figure 2 presents the number of 
transactions that took place between 1994-2011. An increasing trend is observed as 
time passes since it is obvious that more M&As, both domestic and cross borders, 
occurred globally. 
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Figure 2: Number of M&As occurred between 1994-2011 
 
Source: Based on Data from KPMG 
2.4 Classification of Mergers and Acquisitions 
 
The corporate event of M&As is classified into three main categories: horizontal, 
vertical and conglomerate. 
2.4.1 Horizontal M&As 
 
To begin with, according to Leory (2002), the first kind of M&As consists of 
transactions between companies that are found within the same sector of activities. 
In other words, companies that were competitors in the same industry chose to 
merge in order to improve their competitive position. In my opinion, economy of scale 
is the most significant benefit that companies gain from merging horizontally since 
the increasing size also causes an increase of market share. Leory (2002) supported 
that this “size effect” will undoubtedly affect positively the bargaining and negotiation 
power of a company with its vendors and clients. 
2.4.2 Vertical M&As 
 
Cameron and Green (2009) defined vertical M&A as a merger or an acquisition in 
which the two participating companies have a customer-supplier relationship. This 
type of activities allows companies to decrease the number of intermediaries and the 
transaction costs. Leory (2001) adopted the above thesis in his paper high lighting 
the enlarged market power in controlling distribution channels.  
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2.4.3 Conglomerates 
 
If a company acquires or merges with another company which is “neither a 
competitor, nor a buyer, nor a seller” (Cameron and Green, 2009) then this acts 
referred to as a conglomerate. As enterprises that operate under conglomerate 
activities are not found in the same sector or industry, the fundamental reason 
regarding M&As is the diversification seeking.  
3. Mergers and Acquisitions on Shipping Industry 
 
It is an undeniable truth that during the last decades the shipping industry has 
conducted a series of high profile mergers and acquisitions. This industry is mainly 
characterized by big alliances and mergers around the world. Two of the most 
important and possibly the largest M&As that occurred, took place in 1997 and in 
1999 respectively. The first one was the integration of P&O Containers by Royal 
Nedlloyd Line (P&O Nedlloyd) while the second one was the takeover of SeaLand by 
Maersk (Maersk- SeaLand). AP Moller-Maersk, world’s largest shipping company 
headquartered in Copenhagen, operates in more than 136 countries with more than 
500 container vessels generating more than US$60 billion revenues per year. The 
global dominance of Maersk has been achieved by a series of efficient and profitable 
mergers and acquisitions. The pattern of full scale mergers was emerged in the 
second half of nineties, triggered off by the deregulation and the abolishment of the 
liner conference system. Consequently, shipping industry transformed to a 
deregulated market structure having some big participants and a petite number of 
smaller ones.   
3.1 Feedback on Maritime Sector 
 
It can be easily said that in recent years maritime industry has expanded greatly. The 
new century started with numerous orders in vessels due to the increased demand of 
shipping services. Therefore, freight rates increased, providing large profit margins to 
the ship owners and shareholders. Figure 3 presents, on the one side, the existing 
fleet and on the other side, the new vessel orders for the 30 biggest shipping firms 
globally.  
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Figure 3: Operated Fleets and Order book as per 1 October 2015 
 
Source: Alphaliner.com 
The increased demand of the shipping services correlated with the supply growth 
rates in the period 2000-2014 is illustrated in Figure 4. It can be said that from 2008 
until 2009, in the beginning of the global financial crisis, the supply exceeded the 
demand growth. The sudden decrease of imports and exports greatly affected the 
maritime sector. Since 2014 and up to today, demand growth is slightly above the 
supply; therefore, shipping firms continue to order vessels with excessive capacity to 
fulfill their market needs.  
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Figure 4: Growth of demand and supply in container shipping, 2000-2014 (annual 
growth) 
 
Source: Compiled by the UNCTAD secretariat on the basis of data from Clarkson Container 
Intelligence Monthly, various issues. 
3.2 Reasons why shipping firms are engaged into M&As 
 
Some of the key reasons that shipping companies present a high number of M&As 
are below: 
 The U.S. Ocean Shipping Reform Act (1988) in the international liner shipping 
industry. ; 
 The deregulation of the Staggers Act (1980) in U.S. ; 
 Significant changes in the regulations of trucking (Brooks and Ritchie, 2005). ;  
 The challenge to provide door-to-door integrated transportation services 
(Heaver et.al, 2000). ; 
 The need for economic and operational synergies (Carbone and Stone, 2005), 
; and 
 The potential for value creation and other economic gains (Syriopoulos and 
Theotokas, 2007; Samitas and Kenourgios, 2007).  
Das (2011) investigated how shipping companies choose between partnerships and 
acquisitions. By using a large sample of 427 firm-events, he concluded that shipping 
firms are most likely to acquire target firms originating from their home “region”. In 
other words, domestic M&As seem to be more preferable than cross-border M&As. 
Additionally, Das (2011) found that if a shipping company has prior acquisition 
experience, the likelihood of repeating an acquisition is increased since it possess 
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the experience and the means to do so. On the other hand, prior partnership 
experience decreases the percentages of the possibility of a M&A to be preferred.  
3.3 Wealth Effect of M&As in Shipping 
 
Undoubtedly, M&As affect the value of both bidding and target firms. Many studies 
have investigated whether M&A’s impact is positive or negative. Weston et al. (2004) 
classified these studies into three categories: Value increasing, value neutral and 
value destroying studies. Firstly, value increasing studies claim that technology and 
regulatory changes motivate mergers and acquisitions so as efficiency improvements 
to occur. Secondly, value neutral is implied by the hubris hypothesis of Roll, (1986). 
Last but not least, agency managerial and agency problems are associated with 
value decreasing studies. 
Alliances are usually described as forerunners of mergers according to Bleek and 
Ernst (1995). In the attempt to switch from alliance to the potential merger, wealth 
may be destroyed. Harrigan (1988) strengthened even more this proposal by 
providing evidence and showing that approximately 60% of all the alliances fail to 
meet their financial goals. For comparison reasons, Bruner (1999) assessed both the 
value destruction and recovery of an alliance and a proposed merger. He proved the 
existence of significant abnormal returns associated with this corporate event. 
Besides, in 1997, Zhang and Aldridge found a significant effect of mergers and 
alliances on the stock prices of firms in a study mainly concentrated on the Canadian 
airline industry. One year later, in 1998, De Mortanges and Rad (2000), proved that 
the negative market reaction was caused by the negative publicity of the event.  Of 
course, similar studies have been made for various corporate events such as 
earnings, announcements, stock splits and international cross-listings (Miller, 1999). 
Given the fact that there are numerous M&As in shipping industry that affect 
significantly the shareholders’ value, it seems justifiable to conduct a study examining 
this value, taking on account the acquiring firm’s point of view. M&As in shipping 
industry will undoubtedly affect firms’ long term performance, and therefore, should 
be reflected on the stock price when the event is announced (t=0). Even though the 
literature on M&As in maritime is adequate, literature focusing on the financial and 
economic implications of M&As in liner shipping is relatively limited. Specifically, 
Panayides and Gong (2002)found that there is a direct positive impact on the stock 
prices of firms on the announcement day of M&As. This evidence is also supported 
by Samitas and Kenougios (2007) in a later paper, who examined M&As in the tramp 
shipping industry and proved that these events affect positively stock market prices 
and shareholders’ value.  
The majority of the studies analyze the wealth effect of target firms and present 
positive and significant excess returns. Regarding the acquiring firms, the literature is 
restricted. Andreou et al. (2012) presented insignificant results of the abnormal return 
by conducting an OLS regression in the acquirers. The current study will investigate 
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whether there are positive or negative abnormal returns on the announcement day 
for the acquiring company’s shareholders.  
3.4 Deal Characteristics 
 
Due to the fact that there are many contradictory theories and studies related to the 
contribution of mergers and acquisition in the firms’ value creation, i examine a 
variety of characteristics of firms and deals that may affect the impact of M&As. 
3.4.1 Announcement Effect 
 
Target Gains 
Many studies support that there are high significant positive abnormal returns 
observed in the target firms, on the announcement day. Andrade et al. (2001) argued 
that shareholders of the target firms receive important premiums for bestowing 
control to the acquirer.  
Acquirer Gains 
Literature that examines abnormal returns under the scope of the acquirer is 
restricted. This is the main motive to investigate how stock prices of bidding firms 
react on the announcement day. Andrade et al. (2001) found evidence of no 
significant abnormal returns for the acquirers on the announcement day. Netter et al. 
(2010) argued that these findings may have been executed due to the biased sample 
selection procedures that focused only on large mergers. However, the sample of the 
current study covers a variety of deals so the results may be reliable. 
3.4.2 Types of Deal 
 
Cross-Border vs. Domestic M&As 
Shipping firms prefer to conduct cross border mergers so as to promote their 
relationships with their universal clients over the relations with the domestic ones. It 
is obvious that the higher the risk that a cross-border integration has, the higher the 
financial cost of the deal would be. According to Martin et al. (1998), acquirers who 
are seeking international expansion should pay a premium in order to enter the 
market. Target firms have relatively higher benefits in cross-border mergers than in 
domestic. The current study includes a sample of both domestic and cross-border 
mergers as it examines all the events that took place from 2000 up to 2014 globally. 
However, it is well known that the majority of the shipping mergers are classified as 
cross-border. 
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Private vs. Public 
It has been observed that bidding firms gain higher abnormal returns if they acquire 
public target firms instead of private ones. Fuller et al. (2002) claimed that privately 
held companies seem to appear as less attractive investments than similar ones who 
are listed on stock exchange market. This sample contains 18 public and 154 private 
target firms. As the percentage of public firms is extremely low, it is not beneficial to 
investigate them empirically.  
Cash vs. Stock Financed 
Travlos (1987) claimed that M&As financed by cash, experience higher abnormal 
returns for both acquiring and target firms. The above conclusion can be explained 
by the fact that cash payment is a risk free payment, whereas the stock purchase 
includes risk. Fuller et al. (2002) supports that while bidding firms are merged with 
private target and pay in stock, they tend to benefit more than when paying in cash. 
The present dissertation examines the existing sample and presents the result in the 
empirical section. 
Friendly vs. Hostile M&As 
Another factor that holds a significant role in the formation of abnormal returns of 
both target and acquiring firms is whether the merger is friendly or hostile. Hostile 
mergers are extremely rare, as it is well established by existing literature. Roll (1986) 
supported that friendly deals are commonly motivated by hubris, so as the acquirer is 
possible to overpay for the target. In this situation, target firms present wealth 
increase, whereas bidding firms present losses. Rau and Vermaelen (1998) validated 
the above results.   
3.5 Reasons of Failure 
 
First and foremost, the fundamental reason that shipping firms may engage into an 
M&A is cost reduction, or cost minimization. In order to succeed, a merger should 
prioritize its daily production and operation. These two factors generate revenue and 
therefore profits for the company. As financial conditions are changing and 
technology is developing, managers who decide to conduct a transaction like a 
merger or acquisition, should definitely focus on the factors mentioned above. If not, 
the probabilities for a merger failure are greatly increased. 
Cross-border mergers encounter major problems and difficulties. Shipping industry is 
mainly characterized by cross-border M&As due to their object as mentioned above. 
These kinds of operations are proved to be expensive in terms of both time and 
effort. However, there are many legal and regulatory hurdles that managers should 
overcome. The various corporate cultures between enterprises of different counties 
form one of the biggest problems in the cross-border mergers. When the decision of 
a company acquisition or merger is taken, it is based only on market or product 
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synergies. Cultural differences and peculiarities are often ignored. Personnel issues 
cannot be easily overcome.  
Another reason that can damage shareholder value in a potential merger is the 
different perceptions of firm objectives. For instance, managers usually prefer their 
enterprise to be one among the supervisors, while shareholders generally admitted 
that they prefer to become target. The efficiency of the company is absolutely 
affected negatively by the different attitudes of stakeholders. 
What is more, parameters such as tax structures, legal frameworks and insufficient 
information transparency affect absolutely the value creation, by increasing the 
managerial and organizational costs. 
4. Sample Selection and Data Describing 
 
The aim of this research is to examine the stock price reaction to the announcement 
of mergers or acquisitions for a sample of acquiring firms in the liner shipping 
industry. It is well known, that share prices reflect management’s future expectations 
regarding profit and value maximization. According to Efficient Market Hypothesis 
(Fama, 1970), stock prices reflect all available information, as capital markets react 
rapidly to signals and publicly available information. Therefore, if a market receives 
positive feedback about a corporate event, there will be an immediate reflection in 
the form of a positive abnormal return. On the other hand, a negative abnormal return 
occurs if a market receives a potential negative feedback/expectations. 
The time period I have chosen to delve deeper is 2000 to 2014.  The sample covers 
a relatively long period and allows me to separate the sample into two distinctive 
eras, the pre-crisis period of the global financial turmoil of 2008 and the post-crisis 
period. Furthermore, M&A deals were culled from Thomson-One Database applying 
some criteria. The acquirer firms must be public and classified as Freight 
Transportation Company (NAIC code 488510) deriving their main income from the 
provision of deep-sea freight transport services. On the contrary, no special 
characteristics or activity was required for the target firms, which can be either public 
or private. Moreover, the event of merger or acquisition should be finalized. These 
criteria resulted in an initial sample of 223 deals. Data unavailability reduces the 
initial sample to 172. 
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Figure 5: Number of M&A Deals of the sample between 2000-2014 
 
As it is observed from Figure 5, year 2014 presents the most M&A deals that took 
place in the examined period. In 2000 shipping industry conducted only two M&As. 
As time passes, shipping companies engage into big alliances and M&As in order to 
stay competitive and active in the market.  
Furthermore, the market indices in which each acquiring firm is subject to have been 
taken from Bloomberg according to geographical criteria. The required daily stock 
returns for both equities and market indices are retrieved from Bloomberg Database 
and Yahoo! Finance as well.  
4.1 Research Methodology 
 
In order to examine the stock price reaction to the announcement day of mergers and 
acquisitions the classical event-study approach was utilized (Brown and Warner, 
1985). In order to gauge stock price reaction to M&As I have employed the: market 
model and the market-adjusted model. Due to the fact that these two models capture 
formulation of the abnormal return in the most easily way, the current study makes a 
comparison of their results.  
4.1.1 Event- Study Approach 
 
The most valid and consistent method of measuring the impact of any corporate 
event is proved to be the event-study approach. According to Bishop et al. (1987), 
the measurement of returns by event study approach is claimed to be a superior 
method to that of analyzing abnormal returns due to the fact that it offers the “best 
estimates” of post-merger firm’s value. As various corporate events such as earnings 
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announcements, stock splits and mergers announcements reflect management’s 
future expectations, the results should be quantified. According to Halpern (1983), 
the most appropriate date to gauge the impact of an event is the first public 
announcement (event time). At event time t=0, stock prices of both bidding and 
acquiring firms fluctuate to follow the effects of the merger announcement. It has 
been observed that, abnormal returns may exist before the announcement day due 
to the market anticipation or information leaks. Franks et al. (1977) showed that 
share prices start to anticipate the announcement day of merger or acquisition three 
months before, whereas Halpern (1973) argued that the anticipation may start eight 
months prior to the announcement day. Furthermore, abnormal returns may occur in 
the post-event period due to the uncertainty of profitability and success of the merger. 
Nevertheless, at the announcement day, stock prices are adjusted in such way to 
reflect the event.  
According to Panayides and Gong (2002), a 21-day event window is considered to 
be adequate in order to success fully capture the event. Thus, supposing that the 
announcement date is day 0, the event window is the period (-10, 10) days and the 
estimation one is the (-250, -11) period. The 10-day analysis of abnormal returns 
following the announcement is significant due to the fact that the shareholders’ 
wealth effect occur at approximately 10 days after the event. Additionally, the 10-day 
analysis prior to the announcement is significant in order to capture price movements 
based on rumors of the event. Graphical representation of the time line of the event 
study is presented on Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6: Time line for Event Study 
  
 
 -250                                   -10              0             10 
4.1.2 Market Model Application 
 
Brown and Warner (1980 and 1985) concluded that a simple market model is well-
specified and consistent to assess the share-price effects of various corporate events 
by analyzing properties of daily/monthly/ annual stock returns. According to the 
above model, a stock price is said to be linearly related to the market return. 
Standard Market Model approach is adopted in order to calculate the daily abnormal 
returns of the sample firms in the present study. In order to estimate the parameters 
of the market model (intercept, beta coefficient) an OLS regression is used. 
Regressing the daily returns of a firm on the daily return of their market index in the 
estimation window that claimed above (-250, -11), we have calculated the intercept 
and beta coefficient as well. Therefore, the expected return is calculated as follows: 
Post Event Period Event Window Estimation Window 
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?̅?𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎?̂? + 𝛽?̂?𝑅𝑚𝑡 
?̅?𝑖𝑡 is the expected return at time t, 𝑎?̂?and 𝛽?̂?are the parameters estimated from the 
regression claimed above during the estimation window period and 𝑅𝑚𝑡is the realized 
market return (index return) at time t. In addition to the market model, the study 
presents the results of the abnormal return that occur from the market-adjusted 
model. Both models are designed to assess the effect of an unexpected event such 
as M&A announcement.  This model is supposed to be a special version of the 
market model, in which parameter  𝑎?̂? equals to zero and 𝛽?̂? equals to zero for all 
sample companies.  Therefore, we have 
?̅?𝑖𝑡 =  𝑅𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘,𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥,𝑖,𝑡 
Then, the abnormal return𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 has been measured by deducting from the realized 
stock return 𝑅𝑖𝑡the expected return?̅?𝑖𝑡, 
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  𝑅𝑖𝑡 − ?̅?𝑖𝑡 
Having calculated the abnormal return, it is essential to measure the cumulative 
abnormal return in the event window period (-10, +10). So,  
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖(−10.+10) = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
+10
−10
 
The Average Abnormal Return (AR) in the event period is  
𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑡 =
1
𝑁
∑ 𝐴?̃?𝑖𝑡
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
Whereas, the Average Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) for a specified time 
window L during the event period is 
𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝐿 =
1
𝑁
∑ 𝐶𝐴?̃?𝑖
𝐿
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
In order to determine whether statistical significance exists or not, it is essential to 
compute the test-statistic of both average AR and average CAR. 
𝑡(𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑡) =
𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑡
?̂?(𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑡)
⁄  
 
𝑡(𝐶𝐴𝑅) =
𝐶𝐴𝑅 (𝑝, 𝑞)
[?̂?(𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑡) ∗ √𝑞 − 𝑝]
⁄  
Abnormal returns claim to capture all the effects of a corporate event, according to 
the literature of accounting and finance. By assessing the sign and the magnitude of 
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the results in the event window period, the effects of the event may be scrutinized.
  
Having measured both abnormal and cumulative abnormal return it is essential to 
come across with the variables that affect them. According to prior literature there are 
five variables that are deemed vital in the formulation of the dependent variable (AR 
and CAR). Beta coefficient, the bidding firm’s size, the percentage of shares 
acquired, the way of financing and the time that the transaction of M&A took place 
(pre or post crisis of 2008) constitute the independent variables in the regression of 
the present study. The analysis of the variables is found on details in section 5.5 .So 
the proposed linear regression model is given below: 
𝐴𝑅0 = 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 + 𝑎 ∗ (𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎) + 𝑏 ∗ (𝐹𝑢𝑙𝑙 𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦) + 𝑐 ∗ (𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦)
+ 𝑑 ∗ (𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒) +  𝑒 ∗ (𝑃𝑟𝑒 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦) 
𝐶𝐴𝑅(−1,+1) = 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 + 𝑎 ∗ (𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎) + 𝑏 ∗ (𝐹𝑢𝑙𝑙 𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦) + 𝑐
∗ (𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦) + 𝑑 ∗ (𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒) +  𝑒 ∗ (𝑃𝑟𝑒 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦) 
5. Empirical Results 
5.1 Analysis of the Entire Sample 
 
The results of the event study approach are reported below. Panel A lists the average 
abnormal return (in percentage), the t-statistic, and the cumulative average abnormal 
return (in percentage) that have been measured by the Market Model in the event 
window period (-10, +10). Panel B presents the same data but abnormal returns are 
computed by the Market-Adjusted Model. Finally, in Table 2, the CAAR(Cumulative 
Average Abnormal Return) is presented in specific smaller event windows for both 
models. 
Table 1: AAR and CAAR results measured by market and market-adjusted model 
Panel A Market Model Returns Panel B Market-Adjusted Returns 
Day AAR% t-Statistic CAAR% Day AAR% t-Statistic CAAR% 
-10 -0.009 -0.08 -0.01 -10 0.029 0.23 0.029 
-9 0.139 1.23 0.13 -9 0.179 0.93 0.209 
-8 -0.169 -1.50 -0.04 -8 -0.127 -0.91 0.082 
-7 -0.124 -1.10 -0.16 -7 -0.142 -0.95 -0.060 
-6 0.105 0.93 -0.06 -6 0.064 1.03 0.004 
-5 -0.174 -1.54 -0.23 -5 -0.161 -1.71* -0.157 
-4 0.022 0.20 -0.21 -4 0.041 0.24 -0.116 
-3 0.014 0.13 -0.20 -3 0.051 0.97 -0.065 
-2 -0.024 -0.21 -0.22 -2 -0.008 -0.61 -0.073 
-1 0.168 1.49 -0.05 -1 0.194  2.02** 0.120 
0 0.308     2.73*** 0.26 0 0.325   3.23*** 0.445 
  
 
  
 
2 
1 -0.084 -0.75 0.17 1 -0.069 -0.24 0.377 
2 0.068 0.60 0.24 2 0.171 1.26 0.548 
3 -0.091 -0.80 0.15 3 -0.123 -1.09 0.424 
4 -0.155 -1.37 -0.01 4 -0.133 -1.68* 0.291 
5 0.110 0.98 0.10 5 0.136 1.32 0.427 
6 -0.190 -1.69* -0.09 6 -0.185 -1.68* 0.242 
7 -0.120     -1.07 -0.21 7 -0.096 -1.07 0.146 
8 0.166     1.47 -0.04 8 0.173 1.68* 0.319 
9 -0.221    -1.96** -0.26 9 -0.210     -1.60 0.109 
10 -0.266 -2.36** -0.53 10 -0.246 -2.52** -0.137 
(*): significance level 10%, (**): significance level 5%, (***): significance level 1% 
 
From the above results, it is concluded that there has not been any leakage of 
information prior to the announcement day, as abnormal returns fluctuate in low 
levels without giving any clear and strong signal. However, in day=-1 a sudden 
movement of the return from negative to positive levels is observed. In addition, 
during the previous days, abnormal return is ranging from a minimum -0.174% to 
0.022% by using both market and market adjusted model.  Furthermore, in the 
market model all pre-event abnormal returns are not statistically significant, whereas 
in the market adjusted there are two days statistical significant; day= -5 and day=-1. 
There is evidence of statistical significance, however it is not a strong one since it is 
very close to the critical value.  There may be a first indication that market feels the 
magnitude of the upcoming announcement and the expectations are already 
incorporated in returns at day=-1. At day=0, market presents the higher positive value 
of the average abnormal return. Market seems to react strongly on the M&A event. 
This can also be verified by the high statistical significance of the values (significance 
level at=1%). This finding is consistent with the hypothesis according to which, 
strategic moves such as mergers or acquisitions add value to the firm. Panayides 
and Gong (2002)at their study confirmed the above conclusion. On announcement 
day, high significance and positive reaction of the stock market is observed. At the 
period (+1, +10) there is a fluctuation, with the last two days being observed with high 
negative values. The existing volatility may indicate uncertainty among the 
shareholders regarding the profits or benefits from merger or acquisition.  The 
majority of the values in the post-event period are not significant, but there are some 
days in both models that are considered significant. 
On the contrary, CAARs presents significant divergence depending on the method. 
CAARs in the market model, continue the trend that was described in AAR. 
Extremely positive abnormal return is observed when the outcome publicizes (t=0), 
as market reacts to the announcement. After day=5, abnormal return passes to 
negative levels and it keeps increasing (in absolute value) day by day.  This may 
indicate that the announcement of corporate event includes negative information for 
the shareholders of the bidding firms. Market-Adjusted Model, on the other hand, 
presents a low positive reaction on day=0 and greater in the time period (+1,+10). 
The highest value is observed at day=2. Market participants react on stock market 
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activity after the merger or the acquisition has been announced. This may be 
interpreted as signal of market inefficiency in a sense that stock prices did not fully 
reflect publicly available information that is usually incorporated in the first 
announcement.  
Additionally, it is important to compare the results of the cumulative average 
abnormal returns for specified time periods within the event window. So, we have: 
 
Table 2: Various Cumulative average abnormal return of acquiring firm  
Market Model Returns Market-Adjusted Returns 
Period  CAAR% t-Statistic Period  CAAR% t-Statistic 
(-10,-1) -0.052%    -0.14 (-10,-1) 0.120% 0.31 
(-5,-1) 0.007%     0.03 (-5,-1) 0.116% 0.41 
(-1,0) 0.476%   2.98*** (-1,0) 0.519%    3.95*** 
(-10,+10) -0.527%    -1.02 (-10,+10) -0.137%    -0.19 
(-5,+5) 0.163%     0.44 (-5,+5) 0.423%     0.82 
(-1,+1) 0.392% 2.01** (-1,+1) 0.450%     1.30 
(+1,+5) -0.152%    -0.60 (+1,+5) -0.018%    -0.05 
(+1,+10) -0.783% -2.19** (+1,+10) -0.583%    -1.15 
(**): significance level 5%, (***): significance level 1% 
The total cumulative average abnormal return in period (-10,+10) is negative in both 
models, but the values are not significant. The highest significance noted is in period 
(-1,0). Market model results in CAAR 0.476% whereas market-adjusted in CAAR is 
0.519%. Furthermore, these values seem to be among the highest positive values of 
the table. Market expectations regarding value creation from the event is again 
confirmed. Market participants react positively to the upcoming event one day prior to 
the announcement. This reaction remains till the day of announcement as previous 
results reveal. This finding is also confirmed by Samitas and Kenougios (2007), who 
found positive stock market reaction in the period (-1,0) for the tramp shipping. 
Market- Adjusted model does not present any other statistical significance. On the 
contrary, market model provides significant CAAR for the period (-1,+1) and (+1,+10). 
5.2 Comparison of the abnormal returns of the models 
 
Figure 7 below illustrates the trend of the average abnormal return of acquiring firms 
in event period based on market model and market-adjusted model.  Although the 
results accelerate in the same direction for the measurement period, market-adjusted 
model is observed to present higher abnormal returns in absolute value. 
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Figure 7: Average Abnormal returns of acquiring firms in the event period (Market 
Model and Market-Adjusted Model) 
 
For each of the 21 days of measurement, market-adjusted exceeded in abnormal 
return the market model. On the announcement day, market model presented an 
AAR of 0.308%, whereas the market-adjusted a value of 0.325%. These outcomes 
demonstrate that the market-adjusted model generates a better result in the positive 
levels and worse result in the negative levels compared to the market model. That is 
consistent with the literature as the market model is supported to be superior and 
more consistent than the market-adjusted model. 
5.3 Pre-Crisis and Post-Crisis Period 
 
The distinction between pre-crisis and post-crisis period is important in order to 
gather valuable intelligence and reach useful conclusions. The time span is fourteen 
years, beginning in2000 and ending in 2014. This period is intentionally separated 
into two periods; one before the global financial crisis of 2008 and a second one 
immediately after it. During the pre-crisis period (2000-2007) I have decided to 
monitor 74 bidding firms while during the post-crisis one (2008-2014) I analyzed 98 
firms.  
As it is shown of Table 3, the average abnormal return during the pre-crisis period on 
the announcement day of a M&A is 0.77% according to the market model and 0.56% 
according to the market-adjusted model. However, on the announcement day both 
models reveal statistical significance and exhibit a positive CAAR. It is my belief that 
market reacts positively in M&As that took place during the 2000-2007 period. After 
day t=0, there is a fluctuation in the abnormal return, with the majority of them to be 
negative. High significance is observed only in day t=9 and t=10 of the market 
adjusted model. 
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Table 3: AAR and CAAR results of pre-crisis period measured by market and market-
adjusted model 
 
Pre-Crisis Period 
 
 Panel A Market Model Returns Panel B Market-Adjusted Returns 
Day AAR% t-Statistic CAAR% Day AAR% t-Statistic CAAR% 
-10 -0.06 -0.22 -0.06 -10 0.20  1.08 0.20 
-9 0.26 0.93 0.20 -9 0.11  0.58 0.32 
-8 -0.02 -0.07 0.18 -8 -0.03 -0.19 0.29 
-7 -0.24 -0.88 -0.07 -7 -0.24 -1.14 0.05 
-6 0.14 0.52 0.08 -6 0.15  0.57 0.19 
-5 -0.49 -1.77* -0.41 -5 -0.34   -2.04** -0.15 
-4 0.44 1.57 0.02 -4 0.32 1.38 0.17 
-3 0.11 0.41 0.14 -3 0.13 1.19 0.30 
-2 -0.26 -0.92 -0.12 -2 -0.08 -0.80 0.22 
-1 0.32 1.14 0.20 -1 0.34    1.96** 0.56 
0 0.77      2.77*** 0.96 0 0.56      3.33*** 1.12 
1 -0.02 -0.09 0.94 1 0.03  0.19 1.15 
2 -0.26 -0.94 0.68 2 -0.17 -1.07 0.98 
3 0.03 0.11 0.71 3 0.10  0.67 1.09 
4 -0.15 -0.54 0.56 4 -0.12 -0.69 0.97 
5 -0.09 -0.32 0.47 5 0.07  0.44 1.03 
6 -0.15 -0.54 0.32 6 -0.23 -1.40 0.80 
7 -0.15 -0.54 0.17 7 0.01  0.10 0.81 
8 -0.23 0.82 0.40 8 0.10  0.64 0.91 
9 -0.42 -1.50 -0.02 9 -0.51     -2.48*** 0.40 
10 -0.46 -1.66* -0.48 10 -0.48    -2.91*** -0.08 
(*): significance level 10%, (**): significance level 5%, (***): significance level 1% 
On the other hand, in the post-crisis period on the announcement day, abnormal 
returns are positive and statistically significant. According to market model, market 
reacts positively in window (0, 1) whereas in window (2, 10) the reaction is negative. 
This may be interpreted as market inefficiency at the point that share prices do not 
reflect all available information. 
Table 4: AAR and CAAR results of post-crisis period measured by market and 
market-adjusted model 
 
Post -Crisis Period 
 
 Panel A Market Model Returns Panel B Market-Adjusted Returns 
Day AAR% t-Statistic CAAR% Day AAR% t-Statistic CAAR% 
-10 -0.07 -0.43 -0.07 -10 -0.10 -0.58 -0.10 
-9 0.16 0.93 0.09 -9 0.23 1.30 0.13 
-8 -0.28 -1.59 -0.19 -8 -0.20 -1.72* -0.07 
-7 -0.06 -0.36 -0.25 -7 -0.07 -0.76 -0.14 
-6 0.08 0.48 -0.17 -6 0.00  0.04 -0.13 
-5 -0.03 -0.16 -0.20 -5 -0.03 -0.28 -0.16 
-4 -0.29 -1.64 -0.48 -4 -0.17    -2.03** -0.33 
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-3 0.09 0.52 -0.39 -3 -0.01 -0.15 -0.34 
-2 0.06 0.34 -0.33 -2 0.05  0.52 -0.30 
-1 0.10 0.56 -0.23 -1 0.09  0.74 -0.21 
0 0.10 0.55 -0.14 0 0.15   1.67* -0.06 
1 -0.18 -1.01 -0.31 1 -0.15 -1.02 -0.21 
2 0.37   2.14** 0.06 2 0.43     2.04** 0.22 
3 -0.22 -1.26 -0.16 3 -0.30  -1.91* -0.08 
4 -0.20 -1.13 -0.36 4 -0.14 -1.29 -0.22 
5 0.29 1.67* -0.07 5 0.19   1.93* -0.03 
6 -0.18 -1.03 -0.25 6 -0.15  -1.86* -0.19 
7 -0.16 -0.90 -0.40 7 -0.17 -1.13 -0.36 
8 0.19 1.07 -0.22 8 0.23  1.50 -0.13 
9 -0.16 -0.90 -0.37 9 0.02  0.16 -0.12 
10 -0.10 -0.58 -0.47 10 -0.08 -0.53 -0.19 
(*): significance level 10%, (**): significance level 5%, (***): significance level 1% 
To sum up, pre-crisis results are, in absolute values, higher compared to the results 
of the post-crisis period from day -10 up to day +2. Likewise, as previously 
discussed, pre-crisis results are significant on the announcement day. This 
conclusion is also illustrated in the diagram below. Market reacts in a greater degree 
in M&As that occurred prior to the depressing financial crisis of 2008. 
Figure 8: Diagram of AAR% in the event window (-10, +10) in the pre-crisis and post-
crisis period 
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5.4 Cash Vs Stock Financed M&As 
 
Bidding firms can be classified into two categories: strategic buyers and financial 
buyers. Strategic buyers are all those enterprises that acquire other firms in order to 
create synergies. The choice of financing is also affected by the desire to maintain 
ownership concentration and prevailing levels of corporate control. According to 
Travlos (1987), acquisitions that are financed by cash, experience higher abnormal 
returns for acquirers’ shareholders. While cash constitutes a risk-free payment, stock 
payment distributes risk between acquirers and targets. This may increase the 
possibility of misvalued security being used as payment mean. Furthermore, 
Isfandiyar Shaheen (2006) supported that acquiring firms prefer a cash financed 
M&A, when managers believe that their shares are fairly valued. On the other hand, if 
managers believe that their shares are overvalued, they prefer a stock financed 
transaction which allows them to pay less than the announced total amount, by using 
their already overvalued shares as method of payment. In the present research from 
the entire sample of 172 acquirers, 121 of them are stock financed and 51 of them 
cash financed.  
Table 5: AAR and CAAR results cash-financed m&a measured by market and 
market-adjusted model 
  
Cash-Financed M&As 
 
  Panel A Market Model Returns Panel B Market-Adjusted Returns 
Day AAR% t-Statistic CAAR% Day AAR% t-Statistic CAAR% 
-10 -0.26 -0.95 -0.26 -10 -0.24 -0.83 -0.24 
-9 0.35  1.25 0.08 -9 0.69    2.02** 0.45 
-8 -0.35 -1.27 -0.27 -8 -0.33 -1.83* 0.12 
-7 -0.33 -1.19 -0.60 -7 -0.09 -0.69 0.03 
-6 0.38  1.36 -0.22 -6 0.00 0.01 0.03 
-5 -0.53  -1.91* -0.75 -5 -0.52 -2.67 -0.49 
-4 0.19  0.68 -0.57 -4 -0.05 -0.45 -0.53 
-3 0.30        1.07 -0.27 -3 -0.03 -0.20 -0.56 
-2 -0.13 -0.48 -0.40 -2 -0.06 -0.49 -0.62 
-1 0.08 0.27 -0.33 -1 0.16 0.94 -0.46 
0 0.15 0.55 -0.17 0 0.22      1.58 -0.24 
1 0.09 0.32 -0.09 1 0.00 0.01 -0.23 
2 0.46 1.64 0.37 2 0.67  1.76* 0.43 
3 0.04 0.13 0.41 3 -0.01     -0.04 0.42 
4 -0.21       -0.77 0.19 4 -0.01     -0.06 0.41 
5 0.27        0.96 0.46 5 0.03      0.19 0.45 
6 -0.21       -0.77 0.25 6 -0.29     -1.58 0.15 
7 -0.66    -2.37** -0.41 7 -0.59  -2.37** -0.44 
8 0.51       1.82* 0.10 8 0.50 1.84* 0.06 
9 -0.72    -2.59*** -0.62 9 -0.41 -2.15** -0.35 
10 -0.31      -1.12 -0.94 10 -0.24     -1.07 -0.58 
(*): significance level 10%, (**): significance level 5%, (***): significance level 1% 
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Even though literature claims that cash financed purchases experience higher 
abnormal returns, the table above reveals that cash M&A do not reveal any statistical 
significance on the announcement day. Even if average abnormal return is positive in 
both models, the cumulative average abnormal return is negative. Day t=7 and t=0 
present high significance level in both models with negative value. In general the sign 
of AAR% is fluctuating without a specific pattern or outcome. As most of the days in 
the event window present no significance, it is rational to conclude that acquiring 
firms do not experience any abnormal performance in cash financed transactions at 
any time during the period surrounding the announcement. 
Table 6: AAR and CAAR results stock-financed m&a measured by market and 
market-adjusted model 
  
Stock-Financed M&As 
 
  Panel A Market Model Returns Panel B Market-Adjusted Returns 
Day AAR% t-Statistic CAAR% Day AAR% t-Statistic CAAR% 
-10 -0.20 -0.63 -0.20 -10 0.26   0.99 0.26 
-9 0.26  0.82 0.06 -9 -0.15  -0.65 0.11 
-8 0.01  0.05 0.08 -8 -0.01  -0.05 0.10 
-7 -0.21 -0.67 -0.14 -7 -0.04  -0.15 0.06 
-6 -0.13 -0.42 -0.27 -6 0.11   0.30 0.17 
-5 -0.19 -0.61 -0.46 -5 -0.02  -0.10 0.15 
-4 -0.05 -0.17 -0.52 -4 0.17   0.52 0.32 
-3 0.26  0.82 -0.26 -3 0.33     2.42** 0.65 
-2 -0.34 -1.09 -0.60 -2 -0.12 -0.83 0.53 
-1 0.37  1.18 -0.23 -1 0.25  1.03 0.78 
0 0.82      2.59*** 0.59 0 0.52     2.52** 1.30 
1 -0.22      -0.69 0.38 1 -0.14 -0.67 1.16 
2 -0.05      -0.15 0.33 2 -0.02 -0.08 1.14 
3 -0.43      -1.34 -0.10 3 -0.25 -1.27 0.89 
4 -0.32      -1.01 -0.42 4 -0.34  -1.66* 0.55 
5 0.13 0.40 -0.29 5 0.41     2.29** 0.96 
6 -0.07      -0.22 -0.36 6 0.00 -0.02 0.96 
7 -0.03      -0.10 -0.39 7 0.10  0.72 1.05 
8 0.32 1.02 -0.07 8 0.08  0.45 1.14 
9 -0.27 -0.86 -0.34 9 -0.23 -1.31 0.91 
10 -0.33 -1.03 -0.67 10 -0.39 -1.52 0.52 
(*): significance level 10%, (**): significance level 5%, (***): significance level 1% 
On the other hand, stock-financed purchases present high significance level on the 
announcement day. Market reacts in a greater degree when the M&A is financed by 
stock. Furthermore, both values at t=0 are positive in comparison with the cash table. 
The market adjusted model reveals plenty of significant values but they are not 
meaningful because there is no clear trend. CAAR results in market model are mostly 
negative. On the contrary, market adjusted is observed to present positive values in 
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the whole event period    (-10.+10). That confirms the conclusion stated above that 
market adjusted model present higher abnormal and cumulative abnormal return in 
absolute values than those measured by standard market model.  
Figure 9: Diagram of AAR% in the event window (-10,+10) in cash and equity 
financed mergers and acquisitions 
 
At the announcement day is clear enough that stock financed mergers affect the 
market with high value of abnormal return. Managers should proceed in M&As  by 
purchasing stocks instead of cash. This outcome comes in contrast with Travlos 
(1987) who supported that cash-financed stocks present higher abnormal returns. 
Even though cash-financed mergers produce insignificant values, at the period 
(+1,+5) seems to exceed in value the stock financed one.  
5.5 Regression Analysis 
 
The results of an unvaried analysis, that shows how mergers and acquisitions affect 
bidders’ stock price, depend on a number of factors. In order to make conclusions 
regarding the explanatory variables that affect the formulation of the average 
abnormal return and cumulative average abnormal return, it is essential to read 
across prior literature. The five significant parameters that affect the average 
abnormal return and cumulative average abnormal return of bidding firms are 
presented below. 
To begin with, the impact of the beta’s measurement of the acquiring firms is very 
significant. One of the most common reasons, that firms are engaged into mergers 
and acquisitions, is to become able to control the systematic risk. It is an undeniable 
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truth that, market risk cannot be eliminated even with perfect diversification. The 
incentive to reduce systemic risk should be higher for the companies that have a 
higher initial level. It is my firm belief that my  sample incorporates acquiring firms 
that activate globally, so their market indexes are not the same. Therefore, beta 
coefficient may play significant role in the results of AAR and CAAR. Lakonishok and 
Shapiro (1986) have used beta in their regression in an attempt to find out the 
determinants of the stock market abnormal return. Their empirical results have shown 
that traditional measurement of risk, beta, cannot explain the cross-sectional variation 
in abnormal returns.  
The percentage of shares that the bidding firm acquires constitutes a significant 
variable in the regression. An acquiring company may obtain 100% of a target firm or 
only a minority of its shares. This potential is depended on the need of management 
control of the merging firm. Rationally, this fact affects the way and the extent that 
abnormal returns are formulated. When a bidder acquires or totally merges with the 
target firm, both benefits and disadvantages should be measured in a greater 
degree. I have defined full acquisition or full merger using a dummy variable that 
equals one. Percentage less than 100% is defined with dummy variable that equals 
0. 
Besides, the impact of the payment method on wealth effects of merger or acquisition 
is captured with a dummy variable that equals one if the method of payment is cash, 
and zero  otherwise. The bidding firms that have used a combination of stock and 
cash for the payment, are represented by zero value as stock financed mergers. 
According to Myers and Majluf (1984), managers and shareholders of acquiring firms 
prefer a stock financed merger if they think their company is overvalued and a cash 
financed if they think their firm is undervalued. Furthermore, after investigating, 
Travlos (1987) found that there is a negative association of cash financed mergers 
and bidders’ abnormal returns at announcement day. Therefore, a negative 
relationship is expected from our empirical results.  
One more variable that affects the abnormal returns of the acquiring firms is their 
size. The determination of the size has been measured by the logarithm of the firm’s 
market capitalization. If the bidder firm is characterized as enormous firm, with high 
market capitalization and be merged or acquire a low percentage of a target firm of a 
small or medium capitalization, the effect on the abnormal return will be subtle. Luke 
(2014), having used as independent variable the logarithm of companies’ size in his 
regression, supported that the smaller firms may be less liquid. These liquidity 
problems could emphasize and accentuate abnormal returns on the earnings 
announcement and announcement of M&A as well. Unquestionably, the target’s size 
plays also significant role, but in the present study we examine the effects under the 
eye of the acquirers. 
One additional dummy has been used that separates the mergers regarding whether 
their announcement has been made prior to global financial crisis of 2008 or after 
that. Financial conditions are some of the most significant factors for business 
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efficiency, therefore it should definitely be examined. The economic crisis of 2008 
had a huge impact on global financial markets. Mosley and Singer (2009) and 
Sharma and Mathur (1989) have shown that capital market performance has a direct 
link with M&A activities. Martynova and Renneborg (2008) highlight the fact that M&A 
waves are ended by a financial crisis or by a major regulatory change. This statement 
confirms that M&As are strongly affected by the overall economic environment. This 
factor is assessed in details below, as it consists one of the sub-sample of the paper. 
Moreover, having used as independent variables firstly the abnormal return at the 
announcement day and then the cumulative abnormal return (-1,+1) we regressed 
them with the previous described dependent variables. The AAR and CAR that have 
been used are measured by the market model. Additionally, due to the fact that our 
sample includes many years of analysis (2000-2014), we have used year dummies. 
Including dummies for each year allowed the model to attribute some of the variation 
in the data to unobserved events that took place during each year, or otherwise 
characteristic features of that year besides specific events. In other words, including 
dummies results to improving our model due to controlling temporal variation in the 
dependent variable (AR_0 or CAR(-1,+1) ).  
Table 7: OLS Regression Estimation Results for Acquiring Firms 
 
                  AR0   
 
   CAR(-1, +1)   
   
Intercept 0.007 
 
(0.0172) 
 
0.002 (0.2975)   
  Beta  -0.014 (0.0031)* 
 
-0.017 (0.0054)*   
  Full Acquisition Dummy -0.006 (0.0034) 
 
-0.004 (0.0058)   
  Cash Dummy -0.002 (0.0028)   -0.001 (0.0048)       
Size 0.001 (0.0017) 
 
0.002 (0.0029)   
  Crisis Dummy 
Year Dummies 
0.019 
Yes 
(0.0188)  
 
0.013              
Yes 
(0.0326) 
   
  R-squared   30.28%   
 
   14.66%     
  F-statistic 3.47***   
 
 1.46     
  No of Observations    172   
 
172     
 
 
(*): p value <0.05  
 
Abnormal Return Analysis (AR0) 
Our results indicate that the only significant explanatory variable is the beta 
coefficient. As it is observed from the regression table, beta coefficient presents high 
significance level (p-value = 0 and t-statistic= 0.0031) but negative sign. When the 
bidding firm is supposed to incorporate high levels of systemic risk, this results 
negatively in the abnormal return on the announcement day. Due to the fact that 
there is only one significant explanatory variable, acquiring firms seem not to 
experience significant abnormal returns on the announcement day. Full Acquisition 
and Cash Dummy have both negative values and but are not significant. Though the 
absence of the significance, size presents positive value and affect the return in the 
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same direction. Data is not strong enough to so as to reject the null hypothesis that 
these explanatory variables affect the abnormal return on day=0. The standard error 
of all variables is kept in low levels, meaning that the standard deviation of the whole 
sample is low. The R-squared is 30.28 %, which means that the data fit 
approximately 30% the statistical model. This value explains that the variance of the 
errors are 30.28 % less than the variance of the dependent variable. In our model, 
the data do not very well the model, but they are still meaningful and significant. 
Then, F-Statistic examines if a group of variables are jointly significant. In our 
regression, F has a value of 3.47> 1.64 which results in a significant model. 
Cumulative Abnormal Return Analysis (CAR(-1, +1)) 
The constant term of the regression is again positive and non-significant, which 
indicates the positive relationship to the cumulative abnormal return if all the 
variables equal to zero. The sign of all variables is exactly the same with AR_0 
regression. The only statistical significant value is beta coefficient. The five 
dependent variables affect the cumulative abnormal return in the same direction as 
the abnormal return.  However, this regression is not fitted in the data so well as the 
previous one. That is concluded from R-squared which has value of 14.66%. The low 
R-squared value tell us that the model does a poor job  of explaining the 
variation in the variables. As stated before, such values of R-squared are most of the 
time not acceptable. The fact that the outcomes are not so ultimate is also confirmed 
by F-statistic value that is inferior to 1.64.  
Although the model is not considered strong and almost all variables are not 
significant, my results are absolutely consistent with prior literature. Isfandiyar 
Shaheen (2006) comes into the same conclusion regarding the acquiring firms. None 
of his explanatory variables are significant. Furthermore, Andreou et al. (2012) and 
Netter et al. (2011) report insignificant acquirer abnormal and cumulative abnormal 
returns at announcement.  On the other hand, the majority of the studies conclude 
high significance of the variables that refer to the target firms. Panayides and Gong 
(2002), Merikas (2009) and many others present OLS regression results of the target 
firms so as not to reject the null hypothesis.  
6. Conclusions 
 
The wealth effect of M&As for the shareholders of both target and acquiring firms 
remains at the epicenter of M&A literature regardless of the motives behind mergers. 
The present study is a new attempt to investigate the stock market reaction of 
acquiring firms to the announcement merger and acquisitions in the shipping 
industry. Numerous studies on M&As have been conducted in the transportation 
sector, but they focused on the financial and managerial synergies effects. 
Furthermore, there are studies that attempt to explain the stock market reaction to 
the M&As in the shipping industry, such as Panayides and Gong (2002), however, 
focusing solely on the wealth effects of target firms. This happened because, as 
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literature reveals, the wealth effects of the target firms are greater enough in 
comparison with those of acquiring firms.  
The results of this study would be of value to shareholders, management and 
potential investors of bidding firms. Shareholders present an important interest in the 
market’s evaluation of important strategic movements such as merger and 
acquisitions because they affect company’s future growth. Management obtains 
useful information so as to use them for future decisions. The fact that a merger or 
acquisition creates or destroy value for a bidding firm affects undoubtedly the 
decisions and the movements of potential investors.  
The first objective of this study is to compare the market reaction of the bidding firms 
in the shipping industry to M&A announcements. Our findings show that, there is a 
positive reaction to the M&A deals. Shareholders of acquiring firms will receive 
wealth gains from stock price appreciations on day 0. This outcome comes in 
contrast with literature, which supports that gains for the bidding firms are zero or 
positive in the breakeven point. Taken into consideration the high statistical 
significance of both abnormal and cumulative abnormal. Prior to the event, both 
Abnormal and Cumulative abnormal returns fluctuate in negative and positive values 
so as it is difficult to execute precise conclusions. In the post-event period (+1,+10) it 
is not observed a specific trend, but there is also a fluctuation. In the table of CAAR, 
most of the post-event values are observed to be negative.  
What is more, the sample was separated into pre-crisis and post-crisis period. Global 
financial crisis of 2008 had extremely affected investment, productivity and 
consumption globally. The results found that market reacts strongly and positively 
(both abnormal and cumulative abnormal return) in the transactions that took place 
before the outburst of the global financial crisis. On the other hand, in the post-crisis 
period an information leakage is observed, as abnormal returns prior to the event are 
positive. On the announcement day, values are positive, but only the one measured 
by market-adjusted model is significant.  
Last but not least, another sub-sample of the paper constituted the classification of 
the bidding firms into groups depending on the way of financing the event of M&A. So 
two groups have been formulated, the cash financed and the stock financed mergers. 
Although literature claims that cash financed purchases experience higher abnormal 
returns, the results reveal that cash M&As do no present significance on the 
announcement day. On the other hand, stock-financed purchases present high 
significance level on the announcement day. That is, market reacts stronger when 
the M&A is financed by stock. 
Limitations and Recommendations for further research 
One major limitation of this study is the fact that the acquiring firms are shipping firms 
with specific NAIC code, whereas shipping industry is a huge sector with various sub-
sectors. Hence, further research is required in order to examine the stock market 
reaction on the announcement day of M&As in the whole shipping sector or to 
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another industry as well. For example, when new legislation affect an entire industry, 
it is essential to investigate the magnitude of such effects in stock market. 
Furthermore, it would be useful to investigate whether different wealth gains will be 
observed depending on specific characteristics of the deal or of the firms involved. 
For instance, shareholders of acquiring firms will react differently in a domestic M&A 
transaction than in a cross-border one. Undoubtedly, the present study will spur 
further debate and empirical investigation of the M&A issue. 
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